We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect.
Introduction
Models of wage bargaining often assume that unions have an objective function with two elements: wages and employment (Farber, 1978; MacDonald and Solow, 1981; Grossman, 1983; Blair and Crawford, 1984) . Hence, they implicitly adopt the conjecture that union members or the union leadership have other-regarding or social preferences (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) for those who are non-employed or those who would have to fear unemployment in case of rising wages. On the other hand, insider-outsider models of wage bargaining (Linbeck and Snower, 1989) are based on the premise of discrimination between insiders (union members) and outsiders (not members of the union).
In this paper, we assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. A laboratory experiment allows inferring underlying preferences better than data from the field that may be contaminated by factors that are very hard to control for, such as the organization and decision making procedures within a union, inter-temporal aspects of wage setting, unobserved incentives or objectives of union members and so on. Nonetheless, we view our results as complementary to findings based on field data of union wage bargaining behavior. We are not aware of any other laboratory or field experiment that addresses the question of to what extent employment is taken into account in collective wage bargaining.
In our experiment, we set up a stylized labor market with five heterogeneously productive workers, and we vary the number of union members exogenously. In one treatment, all workers are union members that decide on the joint wage level, and in another treatment three out of five (the three most productive workers) are union members. We choose the three most productive workers to be union members to maximize the potential conflict among workers in our setup, without implicating that such a union membership is most realistic. Workers face a (fictitious) firm that bases its employment decision deterministically on the wage rate, and the employment schedule contingent on the wage is common knowledge. The decision making process within the union is captured by a median voting system, i.e. the median wage proposal of the workers who are eligible to vote (five or three) determines the actual wage and, consequently, the employment level. In order to make wage proposals of all union members fully incentive compatible, and not only the proposal of behavior between these two treatments. However, such reasoning is not borne out by the data from our experiment.
A second explanation coming from research on group decision making in economics and social psychology could also be plausible in our context. Group membership leads individuals to more selfish decisions if they cannot be held accountable 2 individually for their choices (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Kugler et al., 2007; Luhan et al., 2009) . Group members have the possibility to "hide" behind others because they are non-identifiable (e.g., Insko et al., 1987 Insko et al., , 1988 Güth et al., 1996; Abbink and Herrman, 2011) . The social demands or moral costs of the decision problem are therefore reduced (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Zizzo, 2010; Abbink and Herrman, 2011) . Whereas the majority of research has been conducted with groups in which group members can interact directly (through a real-time chat or face-to-face communication), our setup does not allow for a group interaction beyond the voting mechanism that determines final wages.
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In order to test whether accountability of single group members influences the extent of other-regarding preferences, i.e. the concern for overall employment, we vary the probability q exogenously. A decreased q should increase other-regarding preferences, and this hypothesis is indeed borne out by the data. However, the sensitivity of other-regarding preferences to q is not very large. It is important to stress the methodological contribution that comes in passing with our variation in q. In a between-subject design we gradually transform a voting game into an individual allocation task, presumably increasing the perceived accountability of participants in the laboratory. This is done without changing the basic setup and instructions of the decision making problem at hand.
Our study provides evidence for the extent to which productive workers take the employment decision of firms and, consequently, the outcome of less productive workers into account. Our stylized setting abstracts from several important features of collective wage bargaining in the real world, but it shows that collective decisions might do a poorer job in taking the least productive into account than individual (dictator) decisions. Put differently, our results indicate that there is what we may label an accountability effect: increasing the level of individual accountability in allocation decisions has the potential to increase the importance of other-regarding concerns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the details of our experimental design and provides theoretical hypothesis. In Section 3 we present the experimental results, first on an aggregate level, focusing on treatment differences, and then on the basis of a regression analysis. Section 4 discusses our findings and concludes the paper.
Experimental design and theoretical predictions

Experimental design of the main part
The main part of the experiment introduced groups consisting of five randomly assembled participants that we referred to as workers in the experimental instructions (see the online appendix for a specimen). Workers are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity; in the experiment we told participants that there were different types (type 1 to type 5, with type 1 being most productive) for which different wage ranges would allow the firm to employ them.
Type 1 would be employed for every permissible wage, type 2 for a smaller wage range starting below the maximum wage, and so on. Details are given in Table 1 .
Depending on the treatment, either all five (all-workers treatment; denomination INS in the following) or only the three most productive workers (insider-outsider treatment;
INSOUT) were eligible to determine the wage level. In the former case there are no outsiders on the market, in the latter case there are two outsiders, and our design assigns the roles exogenously. More specifically, always the more productive workers are insiders in our experiment to maximize the potential conflict among workers. The wage level determines the number of employed workers (see Table 1 ). All employed workers earn the wage, and unemployed worker earn zero.
(Insert Table 1 implemented. As the second treatment variable we vary the probability q with which the median proposal out of the proposals of the union members would become implemented instead of a randomly selected individual proposal from the set of the union members (with probability 1 -q). The variable q is intended to adjust the level of accountability, and it makes sure that, with q < 1, not only the proposal of the median proposer is fully incentivecompatible. The variable q is set at 0.8, 0.2 and 0 in different treatments of our experiment.
The uncertainty coming from q is resolved after making a wage proposal in the treatments with q = 0.8 and q = 0.2. In the treatments with q = 0, we implement one treatment in which participants in the experiment learn only ex post whether one is the "dictator" in determining the wage (denoted EX-POST), and one in which the "dictator" knows it already before determining the wage (EX-ANTE). The latter treatment further increases accountability. Table 2 summarizes the conditions applied in our experiment, and Figure 1 gives a graphical overview. The treatment variation is implemented between experimental subjects.
(Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 about here.)
The determination of the wage is repeated ten times. Types and groups of workers remain constant over these ten periods. 4 At the end of each period, the common wage is announced and everybody sees whether he or she is employed or not. Workers of type 4 and type 5 in the THREE treatments also receive this information, but they cannot submit a wage proposal. Individual proposals are not revealed, but workers learn whether it was the median proposal that was implemented or a randomly chosen proposal of the eligible workers (if applicable). In the EX-ANTE treatments, we asked those workers who knew that they were not going to determine the actual wage level to provide us with the wage level that they would have chosen, had they been selected as the dictator. These choices are of course not incentivized. In the first version of our model, to capture the features of a simple insider-outsider model, we assume that the three most productive workers form a union and vote for the uniform wage that each employed worker receives. Once the wage has been chosen, each worker receives the chosen wage. Non-employment occurs if w > Q i .
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Assume that preferences over employment and wages for each union member are given by:
where λ represents the utility weight that each worker puts on the aggregate employment level, L. We assume that λ is the same for all workers; allowing for individual differences in the parameter is a straightforward extension of our analysis.
The productivities (we often refer to them as "outputs") used in the lab experiment are Q 1 = 100, Q 2 = 50, Q 3 = 33, Q 4 = 25, and Q 5 = 20. 5 In order to simplify the analysis we assume that all employment and wages levels in the utility function are multiple of 100. Hence, we set Q 3 = 100/3 (instead of 33). This assumption seems justifiable, since it is Proposition 1: For each value of λ ≥ 0, there is a unique Nash equilibrium:
• If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ) = (Q 1 ,Q 2 ,Q 3 ).
• If λ > 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ) = (Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ).
Proof: See the Appendix.
The result shows that when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower weight on employment levels than they put on the wage levels, workers vote for the highest possible wage that would maximize their earnings. As a result, the employment level is low. When λ > 1, workers put more weight on employment levels than they put on their wage levels. As a result all workers are willing to accept a wage cut to help other workers get a job. All workers vote for the lowest feasible wage. There is full employment.
All five workers can vote
We now consider the case where all five workers submit a wage proposal. This turns out to be a straightforward generalization of the analysis in the previous section. • If λ > 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ,w 4 ,w 5 ) = ( Q 5 , Q 5 , Q 5 , Q 5 , Q 5 ).
Proof: See the Appendix
The result extends the result in Proposition 1 to the case where five workers (instead of three) vote on the wage level. Again when λ is low (λ < 1), i.e. when workers put a lower weight on employment levels than they put on the wage levels, the employment level is low as workers vote for a high wage, and vice versa.
unlikely that the experimentally observed behavior would be significantly different for Q 3 = 100/3 instead of Q 3 = 33. In the experiment it was easier to use integers.
Discussion of the theoretical results
The conditions on λ in Propositions 1 and 2 are relatively straightforward to interpret. Let us assume that λ = 1. In this case the utility for worker 1, under different employment and wage level combinations, are (100)• (1), (50)• (2), (33.3)•(3), (25)• (4), and (20)• (5), where the first number in the bracket is the wage level, and the second number indicates the employment level. We see that in this case, worker 1 is indifferent between any of those cases and would be willing to go all the way down to w = 20, where the employment level is 5, or accept any other wage-employment combination. The same applies for workers 2, 3, 4, and 5.
If λ < 1, the weight that each worker assigns to the employment level relative to the wage is lower. Higher wages combined with lower employment levels result in higher utilities for every worker. Hence it would be more costly for every worker to vote for a lower wage and thereby ensure that less productive workers get a job. If λ > 1, the reverse is true: higher employment levels result in higher utilities for every workers, and it is therefore less costly for workers to accept a wage cut and thereby ensure that the less productive workers get employed.
Our results are a combination of the choice of the specific form of nonlinear preferences and productivities chosen for the experiment. With different preferences, and the same productivities, or the same utility and different productivities, there would be different Nash equilibria. However the qualitative conclusions for a high (low) λ would be the same: a high λ implies that workers care more about other workers and would be more willing to accept wage cuts in order to help workers that are less productive than themselves.
Empirical implications from the theoretical results
The first prediction from our model is that wage proposals are the same when union membership is restricted to three workers and when all five workers vote. In both cases, a low λ implies that workers vote for the highest feasible wage and low employment, whereas a high λ guarantees that workers are willing to accept wage cuts in order to help other workers get a job. Naturally, the resulting wages are expected to be different because of the median voter scheme.
The second prediction comes from a simple fact: it is more expensive for more productive types to help workers who are less productive. Worker 1 must accept a wage cut of 50 points in order to help worker 2 get a job, whereas worker 4 must only accept a wage cut of 5 points to help worker 5 get a job. Although our model predicts bang-bang solutions with either full selfishness or full employment, our behavioral expectation is that more productive workers are less likely to go down to the next wage level that increases employment. Our theoretical result is implied by the specific functional form of the utility function and the assumption of uniform λ across workers, and other assumptions would yield different predictions.
The third prediction is that more pro-social workers, i.e. workers with higher λ in our model, perhaps because of altruism or inequality aversion, are more likely to propose lower wages.
Finally, we can note that, because votes in our model reveal the worker's true preferences, it would not make a difference to their proposals whether, instead of having the setup considered in this model, we had a unilateral determination of the wage by one of the workers. It will be handy to refer to this observation as a fourth prediction, though of course not one explicitly made within the model itself. The accountability effect referred to in the introduction would, of course, imply a direct violation of this fourth prediction.
Experimental procedure
The computer-based experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of the University of Munich in 2011, using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004) . 440 students from all disciplines participated in 22 sessions, each with 20 participants. Approximately 61% of participants were female. Sessions lasted a bit more than an hour, and the average payoff was 15.64 euro, including a show-up fee of 4 euro.
Upon arrival, experimental participants were seated in separate cubicles. Each session started with instructions for the main part of the experiment (described in detail in Section 2.1). At this stage it was made clear that there would be additional parts of the experiments, but that the instructions for these parts would only be handed out after the completion of the current part. It was also stressed to participants that decisions in one part would be completely unrelated to those in the other parts. Participants received written instructions (see the online appendix), which were read aloud to ensure common knowledge. Everybody had the opportunity to ask questions in private.
only one out of the ten periods in the first part of the experiment. Such a payment scheme avoids monetary complementarities (e.g., wealth effects) between periods that are supposed theoretically to be completely independent. The payoff-relevant period was randomly selected at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate for experimental points into euro (1 experimental point equals 0.25 euro) was clearly stated in the instructions. At the end of each period, every worker was informed about the chosen wage level within the group of five workers (and whether it was the median or a randomly chosen proposal) and about the income of all workers in his or her group. Individual proposals of other workers were never revealed.
Upon completion of the main part of the experiment participants received instructions for the second part that were again read aloud. Remaining questions were only allowed to be asked privately, and also answered privately. The second part was a social preference elicitation task providing an independent test for social preferences taken from Kerschbamer (2012; see the appendix). This was closest in design to the individual allocation task, and more distant in design, as q increases from 0, to the other treatments with median voting.
Subjects are randomly matched with another participant in each of ten binary decisions that allocate a certain payoff to oneself and to the matched participant. One of the ten allocation decisions is paid out for real to the decision maker and the matched participant, where the payoff-relevant allocation decision is randomly determined at the end of the experiment. The ten decisions allow identifying different distributional preferences non-parametrically. Details on the procedure are provided in the appendix. were made privately and in cash.
Results
Overview of choices
We start by giving an overview of the average chosen wage levels in the eight treatments.
Remember that the wage can be determined by the median vote of the eligible workers or by a randomly chosen individual worker. Thus, it makes sense to distinguish between a total average (TOT) and an average including only those cases in which the median was decisive (MED) and not an according-to-probability-q randomly selected group member. Only for MED, the median voter prediction based on selfish decision makers holds. For TOTpredictions based on selfish decision makers one has to take the probabilities that a single member can be decisive into account. Table 3 provides the results.
(Insert Table 3 about here.)
One can see that the actual figures in Table 3 are close to the predictions based on the assumptions for rational and selfish decision makers (see the numbers in parentheses in the eight cells). Obviously, it is more informative to look at averages contingent on types, and we thus refrain from running non-parametric tests on the differences in Table 3 . We provide averages, contingent on types, in Table 4 .
(Insert Table 4 about here.)
There are several ways to slice the data in Table 4 . We start by comparing wage proposals in the insider-outsider treatments (three voters) with proposals in the all-workers treatments (five voters), contingent on the type of worker. There is no significant difference between the two treatments for types 1 and types 2 (Mann-Whitney-U-tests on the individual level (average over the ten periods); p > 0.56 in both cases; q-regimes are collapsed, i.e. N = 88). 7 Only for types 3, wage proposals in the insider-outsider treatments (three voters) are weakly significantly lower than in the all-workers treatments (five voters) (Mann-Whitney-Utest; p = 0.07; q-regimes are collapsed, i.e. N = 88). However, remember that types 3 are only pivotal in the Nash equilibrium with λ < 1 in the all-workers treatments. Therefore, if anything, we would expect a lower average wage proposal for them in the all-workers treatments, whereas the opposite is the case. Hence, one can conclude that there does not seem to be a significant treatment effect in support of union models that take employment into account. In other words, insiders do not seem to lower their wage proposals in order to increase employment compared to the all-workers case. This is in line with our first prediction.
Obviously, a deviation from the selfish prediction in q = 0.8 and q = 0.2 makes only sense if one deviates to a wage level that ensures employment for at least one other worker. This is especially important for type-2 workers in the insider-outsider treatments (potentially going from a wage of 50 to a wage of 33 or lower) and for type-3 workers in the all-workers treatments (potentially going from a wage of 33 to a wage of 25 or lower) with q = 0.8.
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An alternative way of slicing the data is provided by comparing across the four qregimes, holding the number of voters (three or five) constant, contingent on worker types.
The hypothesis would be that there is a significant decline of wage proposals with declining q and from ex ante to ex post for types 1 to 3. Although we will have a closer look at the influence of q on wage proposals in the subsequent section, a first impression is given by twosided Kruskal-Wallis tests. Interestingly, most tests are not significant non-parametrically.
The only two comparisons that come close to significant differences across the four q-regimes are for types 1 in all-workers treatments (p = 0.04) and types 4 in all-workers treatments (p = 0.09). Whereas the wage proposals for types 1 are decreasing with decreasing q (in line with other-regarding preferences extended to uncertainty or with a relatively high λ), they are, on average, increasing for types 4 (clearly contradicting preferences for the worst-off worker, i.e.
type 5, but potentially in line with general other-regarding preferences).
However, it is much easier to control for several determinants of wage proposals in a parametric regression analysis, following in the next section. In the regression, we shall also 7 All p values reported in this paper are two-sided. 8 An online appendix shows the distribution of wage proposals, split up according to treatments and types.
control for the development over the ten periods. Furthermore, the regression allows controlling for individual measures of other-regarding preferences and uncertainty preferences.
Econometric analysis
We continue with a regression analysis of our data. Table 5 contains a multiple level random effects regression model on the wage proposal.
(Insert Table 5 about here.)
It simultaneously controls for the non-independence of observations at the level of subjects (since each subject makes ten choices) and at the level of the group (since a common history is established in each group after the first period). Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4
are dummy variables for workers of the respective type (e.g., Type 1 = 1 with a type 1 worker, else 0). Treatment Group is our q-varying accountability effect variable. It is equal to 1 with the treatments with only a 20% chance that one worker is chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter based on his or her proposal; to 2 with the treatments with a 80% chance that one worker is chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter; to 3 with the treatments where one worker is always chosen ex post as a dictatorial wage setter; and to 4 with the treatments where one worker is chosen ex ante to be the dictatorial wage setter. Incentivized enables us to control for whether a decision is incentivized, as most are, or not; specifically, it is a dummy equal to 1 if a decision is incentivized, which is always the case with Treatment Groups 1-3 and with the ex-ante dictator of Treatment Group 4. INS is the treatment dummy for whether everyone is an insider to the trade union (= 1) or whether only three workers are (= 0). Period captures the period, between 1 and 10, and hence within-experiment experience. Prior Experience (= 1 for subjects with experience in previous, albeit unrelated, experiments) is a dummy capturing between-experiments as opposed to within-experiment experience.
Inequality Averse and Altruist are dummies for whether a subject has been respectively classified as inequality averse or altruist using our independent social preference elicitation task (see the appendix), a standard incentivized measurement of social preferences following Kerschbamer (2012) .
Finally, we include some interaction variables involving the type dummies with (a)
Treatment Group, to enable us to verify the sensitivity of type dummies effects to changes in q and how close the decision environment is to that of a unionized labor market, or (b)
Inequality Averse, as behavior of subjects classified as inequality averse by the preference elicitation task may change depending on where they stand in terms of type, or (c) Altruist, for similar reasons in relation to subjects classified as altruists.
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A potential limitation of the regression in Table 5 is that it does not control for the fact that wage proposals are bounded between 1 and 100. Table 6 presents random effects Tobit regressions on the wage proposal controlling for the non-independence of observations at the level of subjects; we solve the problem of non-independence of observation at the level of groups, as separate from the non-independence of observations at the level of subjects, by running regressions partitioned by subject type: for example, the regression by type 1 includes only wage proposals made by type 1 in the experiment.
(Insert Table 6 about here.)
One of the results from the descriptive analysis of Section 3.1 is that, in line with the first empirical prediction of our model, full or partial union membership do not affect wage proposals for the worker types that make proposals in both cases (types 1, 2 and 3); this remains the case in the regression analysis (e.g., in relation to Table 5 , p = 0.88). Another result from the descriptive analysis is that wage proposals are sensitive to the worker type. Table 6 corroborates this finding, with the highest wage proposals observed for type 1 workers (p < 0.001), followed at a distance by type 2 (p < 0.001), followed by type 3 (p < 0.02), with no significant difference observed between type 4 and type 5 workers. These observations are in line with the second empirical prediction of our model. 9 An online appendix presents regressions that control for a number of other individual characteristics, namely risk attitude, ambiguity attitude, inconsistency of choices, sensitivity to social pressure (social desirability), age, gender and economics study. All the qualitative results of this section are replicated, though the evidence for an effect of Treatment Group on Type 1 wage proposals, referred to below, is stronger (p = 0.044) in the equivalent of Table 6 .
In relation to type 1 workers, this result has to be seen however in combination in Table   5 with the statistical significance of the negative coefficient on Type 1 × Treatment Group (p = 0.001), or equivalently of Treatment Group in the type 1 Tobit regression of Table 6 (p = 0.06). Put it differently, Type 1 workers make lower wage proposals, i.e. behave more kindly, when the decision environment is closer to that of the individual allocation task and the preference elicitation task; but, as the decision environment becomes closer to that of a trade union setting (i.e., Treatment Group is lower), this effect disappears. This is consistent with an accountability effect as discussed in the introduction, but inconsistent with the fourth prediction of our model: whether the decision environment mirrors an individual allocation task or a voting game should not matter.
Result 1. Having a full membership or partial membership trade union does not affect wage proposals. This fits the first prediction of our model. Result 2. Wage proposals are differentiated by worker type and in the direction
predicted by our model. This fits our second prediction.
Result 3. Type 1 workers behave less kindly the more the decision environment is closer to that which one would expect from a trade union wage setting as opposed to an individual allocation task. This is consistent with an accountability effect but inconsistent with the fourth prediction of our model.
Being classified as inequality averse in the preference elicitation task does partially compensate for the strategic incentive for a high wage proposal for type 1 workers (p < 0.001
in Table 5 and p < 0.01 in Table 6 ), but only partially so: e.g., the marginal effect for the wage proposal of being type 1 in the union wage environment (Treatment Group = 1) is still of the order of around + 62 experimental points even for inequality averse subjects based on Table   5 . Table 5 also shows some evidence of an effect of being classified as altruist in the preference elicitation task on lower wage proposals (p = 0.07), but the coefficient is less than half as large as that for inequality averse, and is not robust enough to achieve statistical significance in the Table 6 Tobit regression for type 1 (p = 0.47). For type 1 workers, a lower wage proposal can unequivocally be interpreted as leading to lower inequality, and so the predictive power of inequality aversion for type 1 workers is consistent with the third prediction of our model, though obviously our model is silent on the differential predictive power of our proxies for altruistic and inequality averse preferences. We are not able to find other evidence of the predictive power of the social preference elicitation task except insofar as inequality averse type 5 workers tend to offer higher wage proposals than if they are not inequality averse according to Table 6 (p = 0.01).
Result 4. Being classified as inequality averse in the preference elicitation task predicts kind behavior for type 1 workers, which is consistent with the third prediction of our model. It is a better predictor of kinder behavior by type 1 workers than being classified as altruist.
The coefficient on Period is only marginally significant in Table 5 (p = 0.08); based on Table 6 , within-experiment experience does appear to bring higher wage proposals for type 1 workers (p < 0.05) and type 2 workers (p < 0.02), though the effect is quantitatively small.
Experience in prior but unrelated experiments instead predicts higher wage proposals (p < 0.001 in Table 5 ), an effect that appears largely driven by and is large for type 1 workers (p < 0.01, Table 6 ), for which such experience predicts a higher wage proposals by around 60
points. This, of course, may be due not to learning but rather to sample selection: e.g., more
self-interested subjects may be more likely to participate in experiments to make money, implying lower λ and therefore higher wage proposals in our model. Motivation clearly matters in at least another sense, in that, unsurprisingly, incentivized choices lead to higher wage proposals (p < 0.001 in Table 5 ; robust for type 1, 2 and 4 workers in Table 6 ). (Insert Table 7 about here.)
It may also be instructive to run a Tobit regression on wage proposals for period 1 only, as this enables us to use the wage proposals of each subject as an independent observation, due to the lack of a common history. We do this in Table 7 . Results 1 through 4 are generally supported: there is no effect of INS, worker types' behavioral differences are large and along the lines of insider-outsider theories (e.g. p < 0.001 for type 1), and inequality aversion leads to lower wage proposals for type 1 workers (p < 0.001), though a smaller period 1 effect exists also for type 2 (p < 0.05) and type 3 workers (p = 0.05); we also confirm the lack of robustness on the results of Altruist, as being classified as altruist does not predict lower wage proposals. Whether choices are incentivized does not seem to matter in period 1 (p = 0.53),
qualifying Result 5, but the significance of prior experimental experience in predicting higher wage proposals carries through (p = 0.001).
Result 6. Results 1 through 4 are robust if we focus only on period 1 wage proposals. In relation to Result 5, prior experimental experience matters for
period 1 wage proposals.
Discussion and conclusion
We implemented a very stylized wage setting based on union members voting on their preferred wages and, consequently, implementing a certain employment level. Workers are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity, and there is thus a conflict among selfish workers with regard to the optimal wage. In line with our theoretical prediction, there is no difference in wage proposals between a setting in which all five workers vote on the wage level and a setting in which only the three most productive workers are allowed to vote. The more the voting system is transformed from a median voter scheme to an individual allocation task, the more employment levels are taken into account by workers. In other words, on average, wages go down to allow less productive workers being employed. Overall, the level of pro-social preferences we found is small; however, independent measures of pro-social preferences are still a good predictor for wage proposals of workers.
Our setup incorporates an allocation decision into a labor market setting and disentangles the effects from the individual allocation task and the median voter decision by union members. Both the union framing and the gradual transformation from a median voter scheme to a dictator scheme are unique in the behavioral economics literature. They allow for new insights and several potential extensions beyond this paper. Naturally, one has to exercise caution when generalizing the results from the experiment to real wage setting environments.
It was not the aim of this experiment to capture the peculiarities of natural institutions and the behavior of unions. Nonetheless, there are a couple of findings from the experiment that provide important implications for the real world. First, voting systems in allocation tasks seem to have the tendency to reduce accountability and, thus, lead to more selfish outcomes than systems in which single decision makers, though still anonymous, can be held accountable. Second, the size of the union does not seem to play a large role in the allocative function through wage setting beyond the mechanic effect of the median voter scheme. Of course, it is possible that the size of the union is important in another dimension, namely in determining the power of a union, which we neglected here.
Extending our setup is a straightforward issue. Several dimensions seem worthwhile investigating. One could think of varying the parameters of our setup, especially the distribution and the exact choice of productivity levels of workers. One could also introduce uncertainties over certain aspects of the interaction. Tables   Table 1: MED refers to periods in which the median was decisive; TOT refers to the total average, including all periods. q = 0 (EX-ANTE) only includes incentivized choices. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first prove that the strategy profiles described in the proposition are Nash equilibria under the stated conditions on λ, and we then prove uniqueness.
Consider the strategy profile (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 )=(Q 1 ,Q 2 ,Q 3 ). To prove that w i =Q i is a unique best reply for worker i, we show that setting w i =Q i is a unique best reply ex post when i is decisive, and a (possibly non-unique) best reply ex post under the median rule. This then implies that w i =Q i is overall a unique best reply for worker i.
When worker 1 is decisive, w 1 =Q 1 is optimal if 100 ≥ max{50 (2) , and this again holds when λ>1. As before, any deviation leaves the median unchanged, so payoffs under the median rule are maximized at w 3 =Q 5 . We thus conclude that (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 )=(Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ) is a Nash equilibrium when λ>1.
Proving Uniqueness
Consider an arbitrary strategy profile. The argument above shows that, if λ≤1, when worker i is decisive, then w i =Q i is a unique best reply. We now show that under the median rule worker i receives a payoff of w i =Q i that it at least as high as, or strictly higher than, the payoff from any other choice of w i . In other words, setting w i =Q i is a strictly dominant strategy for worker i=1,2,3, and this implies uniqueness. The fact that setting w i =Q i under the median rule is optimal follows from the fact that, whatever the other workers' choices, worker i moves the median closest to her optimal value, which, when λ≤1, is Q i , by setting w i =Q i (other values of w i may be equally optimal, but w i =Q i is always among the set of optimal choices). To be more precise, suppose the median of the other workers' wages is below Q i . Then setting w i =Q i either increases the overall median and brings it closer to Q i , or leaves it unchanged. In either case, w i =Q i is better or at least as good as any choice w i <Q i when λ≤1. Suppose next that the median of the other workers' wages is above Q i . By setting w i =Q i the overall median is either lowered towards Q i or is the same as the median of the other workers' wages. In the first case worker i is more likely to be employed under the median rule and employment can only increase, so i's utility will also increase. In the second case i's utility is the same under the median rule no matter what i decides, so setting w i =Q i is optimal. This shows that for each worker i setting w i =Q i is optimal under the median rule. Combining this with the fact that w i =Q i is uniquely optimal when worker i is decisive, shows that (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 )=(Q 1 ,Q 2 ,Q 2 ) is a unique Nash equilibrium when 0≤λ≤1.
Suppose then λ>1. We again prove that setting w i =Q 5 is a strictly dominant strategy for each worker i. We already know that when worker i is decisive, w i =Q 5 is a unique best reply.
Under the median rule, when λ>1 worker i's best outcome is that the median wage is Q 5 .
Thus, it again follows that, no matter the other workers' wage choices, worker i will want to bring the median as close to Q 5 as possible; setting w i =Q 5 is always the wage that accomplishes this objective. This shows that setting w i =Q 5 is a strictly dominant strategy for each worker i when λ>1. This, in turn implies that the Nash equilibrium (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 )=(Q 5 , Q 5 , Q 5 ) is unique when λ>1.
Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that when λ≤1 then the strategy profile where worker i sets w i =Q i , i=1,...,5, is a Nash equilibrium. A straightforward extension of the computations for the case where only workers 1, 2, and 3 could submit a wage shows that, when decisive, w i =Q i is uniquely optimal for worker i when λ≤1. We next show that w i =Q i is also optimal under the median rule. Given the profile (w 1 ,...,w 5 )=(Q 1 ,...,Q 5 ), the median is q 3 . worker 1 can lower the median from Q 3 to Q 4 (but not by more) by setting w 1 ≤Q 4 . This deviation is unprofitable when λ λ ) 3 )( 3 / 100 ( ) 4 ( 25 ≤ , which holds since λ≤1. Also, no upwards deviation from w i =Q 1 is profitable since it can only lead to being unemployed onself and a decrease in overall employment. Similarly, worker 2 can lower the median to Q 4 by setting w 2 ≤Q 4 . As for worker 1, this is unprofitable whenever λ≤1. As for worker 1, no upwards deviation is profitable.
Consider then worker 3. A deviation to w 3 ≤Q 4 again lowers the median to Q 4 , but, once more, λ≤1 implies that this, as well as any upwards deviation, is unprofitable. Both workers 4 and 5 are unemployed under the median rule; no downwards deviation can affect the median and hence their chance of getting a job, so payoffs are the same. Also, no upwards deviation is profitable since that keeps them unemployed and reduces overall employment. Thus w 4 =Q 4 and w 5 =Q 5 are optimal for workers 4 and 5 under the median rule. We thus conclude that when λ≤1 setting w i =Q i is a unique best reply to the profile (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ,w 4 ,w 5 )=(Q 1 ,Q 2 ,Q 3 ,Q 4 ,Q 5 ).
Consider next the profile (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ,w 4 ,w 5 )=(Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ). A straightforward generalization of the three-worker analysis shows that when λ>1 and worker i=1,2,3,4,5 is decisive, w i =Q 5 is optimal. Next, consider payoffs under the median rule. Since the median is Q 5 and no worker can affect the median by a deviation, each worker earns the same regardless of her choice of wage, so setting w i =Q 5 is optimal. This proves that (w 1 ,w 2 ,w 3 ,w 4 ,w 5 )=(Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ,Q 5 ) is a Nash equilibrium when λ>1. for WPT d < 0: |WTP d | = amount of own material payoff the decision maker is willing to give up in the domain of disadvantageous inequality in order to decrease the other's material payoff by one unit (in this interpretation inequalities need to be reversed; for instance, subjects who never switch on the X-list reveal that they are willing to give up at least 50 Cents of their own income to decrease the income of the other player by 1 Euro); WTP a defined similarly for the domain of advantageous inequality.
Translation of Choices in the Distributional-Preferences Elicitation
